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Abstract—The spread of harmful mis-information in social
media is a pressing problem. We refer accounts that have the
capability of spreading such information to viral proportions as
“Pathogenic Social Media” accounts. These accounts include ter-
rorist supporters accounts, water armies, and fake news writers.
We introduce an unsupervised causality-based framework that
also leverages label propagation. This approach identifies these
users without using network structure, cascade path information,
content and user’s information. We show our approach obtains
higher precision (0.75) in identifying Pathogenic Social Media
accounts in comparison with random (precision of 0.11) and
existing bot detection (precision of 0.16) methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
The spread of harmful mis-information in social media is a
pressing problem. We refer accounts that have the capability of
spreading such information to viral proportions as “Pathogenic
Social Media” (PSM) accounts. These accounts include ter-
rorist supporters accounts, water armies, and fake news writ-
ers. These organized groups/accounts spread messages re-
garding certain topics. They might be multiple people that
tweet/retweet through multiple accounts to promote/degrade an
idea. This can influence public opinion. Identifying PSM ac-
counts has important applications to countering extremism [1],
[2], the detection of water armies [3], [4], [5] and fake news
campaigns [6], [7], [2]. In Twitter, many of these accounts are
social bots.
The PSM accounts that propagate information are key to a
malicious information campaign and detecting them is critical
to understanding and stopping such campaigns. However, this
is difficult in practice. Existing methods rely on message con-
tent [8], network structure [9] or a combination of both [10],
[11], [12]. However, reliance on information of this type
leads to two challenges. First, network structure is not always
available. For example, the Facebook API does not make this
information available without permission of the users (which
is likely a non-starter for PSM accounts). Second, the use
of content often necessitates the training of a new model for
a previously unobserved topics. For example, PSM accounts
taking part in elections in the U.S. and Europe will likely
leverage different types of content. In this paper, we propose a
method based on causal analysis to avoid these very problems.
The main requirement is an activity log of user’s activities and
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timestamp. Further, as our method does not rely on data used
in previous approaches, it is inherently complementary which
allows for future combined methods.
In this paper, we aim to find PSM users in the viral cas-
cades. As viral cascades are so rare, the users that cause them
are suspicious accounts. To address these issues, we leverage
causal analysis [13], [14]. We developed, implemented, and
evaluated a framework for identifying PSM accounts. This
paper makes the following contributions:
• We proposed a PSM detection framework that does not
leverage network structure, cascade path information,
content and user’s information.
• We observed that PSM accounts have higher causality
values.
• We introduced a series of causality-based metrics for
identifying PSM users - which alone can achieve pre-
cision of 0.66.
• We introduced an unsupervised label propagation frame-
work that, when combined with our causal metrics,
provide a precision of 0.75. We showed that our frame-
work significantly outperforms random method (0.11),
the content-based bot detection (0.13), all features (0.16),
and Sentimetrix [10] (0.11).
• Our framework is able to find the more important PSM
accounts in comparison with the baseline methods. The
larger the cascade is, the more important its PSM ac-
counts are and our model can capture those cascades
better.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe our framework that leverages causal analysis
and label propagation. Then we present the algorithms in
Section III. This is followed by a description of our dataset in
Section IV. In Section V, the causality analysis is discussed.
Then we describe our implementation and discuss our results
in Section VI. Finally, related work is reviewed in Section VII.
II. TECHNICAL APPROACH
A. Technical Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we shall represent cascades as an
“action log” (Actions) of tuples where each tuple (u,m, t) ∈
Actions corresponds with a user u ∈ U posting message m ∈
M at time t ∈ T , following the convention of [15]. We assume
that set M includes posts/repost of a certain original tweet
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or message. For a given message, we only consider the first
occurrence of each user. We define Actionsm as a subset of
Actions for a specific message m. Formally, we define it as
Actionsm = {(u′,m′, t′) ∈ Actions s.t. m′ = m}.
Definition 1. (m-participant). For a given m ∈ M , user u
is an m-participant if there exists t such that (u,m, t) ∈
Actions.
Note that the users posting tweet/retweet in the early stage
of cascades are the most important ones since they play a
significant role in advertising the message and making it viral.
For a given m ∈ M , we say m-participant i “precedes” m-
participant j if there exists t < t′ where (i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈
Actions. Thus, we define key users as a set of users adopting a
message in the early stage of its life span. We formally define
key user as follows:
Definition 2. (Key User). For a given message m, m-
participant i, and Actionsm, we say user i is a key user iff
user i precedes at least φ fraction of m-participants (formally:
|Actionsm|×φ ≤ |{j|∃t′ : (j,m, t′) ∈ Actionsm ∧ t′ > t}|,
(i,m, t) ∈ Actionsm), where φ ∈ (0, 1).
The notation | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. All
messages are not equally important. That is, only a small
portion of them gets popular. We define viral messages as
follows:
Definition 3. (Viral Messages). For a given threshold θ, we
say that a message m ∈ M is viral iff |Actionsm| ≥ θ. We
use Mvir to denote the set of viral messages.
The Definition 3 allows us to compute the prior probability
of a message (cascade) going viral as follows:
ρ =
|Mvir|
|M | (1)
We also define the probability of a cascade m going viral
given some user i was involved as:
pm|i =
|{m ∈Mvir s.t. i is a key user}|
|{m ∈M s.t. i is a key user}| (2)
We are also concerned with two other measures. First, the
probability that two users i and j tweet or retweet viral post m
chronologically, and both are key users. In other words, these
two users are making post m viral.
pi,j =
|{m ∈Mvir|∃t, t′ where t < t′ and
(i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions}|
|m ∈M |∃t, t′ where (i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions|
(3)
Second, the probability that key user j tweets/retweets viral
post m and user i does not tweet/retweet earlier than j. In
other words, only user j is making post m viral.
p¬i,j =
|{m ∈Mvir|∃t′ s.t. (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions and
6 ∃t where t < t′, (i,m, t) ∈ Actions}|
|{m ∈M |∃t′ s.t. (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions and
6 ∃t where t < t′, (i,m, t) ∈ Actions}|
(4)
Knowing the action log, we aim to find a set of pathogenic
social media (PSM) accounts. These users are associated
with the early stages of large information cascades and, once
detected, are often deactivated by a social media firm. In the
causal framework, we introduce a series of causality-based
metrics for identifying PSM users.
B. Causal Framework
We adopt the causal inference framework previously in-
troduced in [13], [14]. We expand upon that work in two
ways: (1.) we adopt it to the problem of identifying PSM
accounts and (2.) we extend their single causal metric to a set
of metrics. Multiple causality measurements provide a stronger
determination of significant causality relationships. For a given
viral cascade, we seek to identify potential users who likely
cause the cascade viral. We first require an initial set of criteria
for such a causal user. We do this by instantiating the notion
of Prima Facie causes to our particular use case below:
Definition 4. (Prima Facie Causal User). A user u is a prima
facie causal user of cascade m iff: User u is a key user of m,
m ∈Mvir, and pm|u > ρ.
For a given cascade m, we will often use the language prima
facie causal user to describe user i is a prima facie cause for
m to be viral. In determining if a given prima facie causal
user is causal, we must consider other “related” users. In this
paper, we say i and j are m-related if (1.) i and j are both
prima facie causal users for m, (2.) i and j are both key users
for m, and (3.) i precedes j. Hence, we will define the set of
“related users” for user i (denoted R(i)) as follows:
R(i) = {j s.t. j 6= i , ∃m ∈M s.t. i, j are m−related} (5)
Therefore, pi,j in (3) is the probability that cascade m goes
viral given both users i and j, and p¬i,j in (4) is the probability
that cascade m goes viral given key user j tweets/retweets it
while key user i does not tweet/retweet m or precedes j. The
idea is that if pi,j − p¬i,j > 0, then user i is more likely a
cause than j for m to become viral. We measure Kleinberg-
Mishra causality (K&M ) as the average of this quantity to
determine how causal a given user i is as follows:
K&M (i) =
∑
j∈R(i)(pi,j − p¬i,j)
|R(i)| (6)
Intuitively, K&M measures the degree of causality exhibited
by user i. Additionally, we find it useful to include a few other
measures. We introduce relative likelihood causality (rel) as
follows:
rel(i) =
∑
j∈R(i) S(i, j)
|R(i)| (7)
S(i, j) =

(
pi,j
p¬i,j+α
)− 1, pi,j > p¬i,j
0, pi,j = p¬i,j′
1− (p¬i,jpi,j ), otherwise
(8)
where α is infinitesimal. Relative likelihood causality metric
assesses the relative difference between pi,j and p¬i,j . This
helps us to find new users that may not be prioritized by
K&M . We also find that if a user is mostly appearing after
those with the high value of K&M , then it is likely to be
a PSM account. One can consider all possible combinations
of events to capture this situation. However, this approach
is computationally expensive. Therefore, we define Q(j) as
follows:
Q(j) = {i s.t. j ∈ R(i)} (9)
Consider the following example:
Example 1. Consider two cascades (actions) τ1 =
{A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H} and τ2 = {N, M, C, A, H, V, S, T}
where the capital letters signify users. We aim to relate key
users while φ = 0.5 (Definition 2). Table I shows the related
users R(.) for each cascade. Note that the final set R(.) for
each user, is the union of all sets from the cascades. Set Q(.)
for the users of Table I are presented in Table II.
TABLE I: Related users R(.) (5) of cascades τ1 =
{A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H} and τ2 = {N, M, C, A, H, V, S, T}
User Rτ1 Rτ2 R
A {B, C, D, E, F} {H, V} {B, C, D, E, F, H, V}
B {C, D, E, F} {} {C, D, E, F}
C {D, E, F} {A, H, V} {A,D, E, F, H, V}
D {E, F} {} {E, F}
E {F} {} {F}
N {} {M, C, A, H, V} {A, C, H, M, V}
M {} {C, A, H, V} {A, C, H, V}
H {} {V} {V}
TABLE II: Set Q(.) of users Table I in (9)
User Total
A {C, N, M}
B {A}
C {A, B, N, M}
D {A, B, C}
E {A, B, C, D}
N {}
M {N}
H {A, C, N, M}
Accordingly, we define neighborhood-based causality (nb)
as the average K&M (i) for all i ∈ Q(j) as follows:
nb(j) =
∑
i∈Q(j) K&M (i)
|Q(j)| (10)
The intuition behind this metric is that accounts who are
retweeting a message that was tweeted/retweeted by several
causal users are potential for PSM accounts. We also define
the weighted neighborhood-based causality (wnb) as follows:
wnb(j) =
∑
i∈Q(j) wi × K&M (i)∑
i∈Q(j) wi
(11)
The intuition behind the metric wnb is that the users in Q
may not have the same impact on user j and thus different
weights wi are assigned to each user i with K&M (i).
C. Problem Statements
Our goal is to find the potential PSM accounts from the cas-
cades. Assigning a score to each user and applying threshold-
based algorithm is one way of selecting users. In the previous
section, we defined causality metrics where each of them or
combination of them can be a strategy for assigning scores.
Users with high values for causality metrics are more likely
to be PSM accounts - later we demonstrate the relationship
between these measurements and the real world by identifying
accounts deactivated eventually.
Problem 1. (Threshold-Based Problem). Given a causality
metric k where k ∈ {K&M, rel, nb, wnb}, parameter θ, set
of users U , we wish to identify set {u s.t. ∀u ∈ U, k(u) ≥ θ}.
We find that considering a set of cascades as a hypergraph
where users of each cascade are connected to each other can
better model the PSM accounts. The intuition is that densely
connected users with high values for causality are the most
potential PSM accounts. In other words, we are interested in
selecting a user if (1.) it has a score higher than a specific
threshold or (2.) it has a lower score but occurs in the cascades
where high score users occur. Therefore, we define the label
propagation problem as follows:
Problem 2. (Label Propagation Problem). Given a causality
metric k where k ∈ {K&M, rel, nb, wnb}, parameters θ,
λ, set of cascades T = {τ1, τ1, ..., τn}, and set of users U ,
we wish to identify set S : S1,S2, ...,Sl, ...,S|U | where Sl =
{u|∀τ ∈ T ,∀u ∈ (τ\Sl−1), k(u) ≥ (H lτ − λ)} and H lτ =
{min(k(u)) s.t. ∀u ∈ τ ∧ u ∈
⋃
l′∈[1,l)
Sl′}.
III. ALGORITHMS
A. Algorithm for Threshold-based Problems
To calculate causality metrics, we use map-reduce program-
ming model. In this approach, we select users with causality
value greater than or equal to a specific threshold. We refer to
this approach as the Threshold-Based Selection Approach.
B. Label Propagation Algorithms
Label propagation algorithms [16], [17], [18] iteratively
propagate labels of a seed set to their neighbors. All nodes
or a subset of nodes in the graph are usually used as a seed
set. We propose a Label Propagation Algorithm (Algorithm 1)
to solve problem 2. We first take users with causality value
greater than or equal to a specific threshold (i.e. 0.9) as the
seed set. Then, in each iteration, every selected user u can
activate user u′ if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(1.) u and u′ have at least one cascade (action) in common
and (2.) k(u′) ≥ k(u) − λ, λ ∈ (0, 1). Note that, we set a
minimum threshold such as 0.7 so that all users are supposed
to satisfy it. In this algorithm, inputs are a set of cascades
(actions) T , causality metric k and two parameters θ, λ in
(0, 1). This algorithm is illustrated by a toy example:
Example 2. Consider three cascades {{A, B, G}, {A, B, C,
D, E, G, H, I}, {E, H, I}} as shown in hypergraph Fig. 1.
Let us consider the minimum acceptable value as 0.7; in this
case, users C and E would not be activated in this algorithm.
Assuming two parameters θ = 0.9, λ = 0.1, both users A
and G get activated (Fig. 1a). Note that an active user is able
to activate inactive ones if (1.) it is connected to the inactive
user in the hypergraph, (2.) score of the inactive user meets
the threshold. In the next step, only user B will be influenced
by G (0.82 ≥ 0.92− 0.1) as it is shown in Fig. 1b. Then, user
D will be influenced by user B (0.73 ≥ 0.82 − 0.1). In the
next step (Fig. 1d), the algorithm terminate since no new user
is adopted. As it is shown, user I and H are not influenced
although they have larger values of  in comparison with user
D.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1: A toy example of Algorithm ProSel. Blue faces depict
active users.
Algorithm 1 Label Propagaton Algorithm (ProSel)
1: procedure PROSEL(T , k, θ, λ)
2: S = {(u, k(u))|∀u ∈ U, k(u) ≥ θ}
3: R = S
4: H = ∅
5: while |S| > 0 do
6: H ′ = {(τ, m)|∀(τ, ) ∈ H, m =
min(,min({′ = Su s.t. ∀u ∈ τ ∧ u ∈ S}))}
7: H = H ′ ∪ {(τ, m)|∀τ ∈ T ∧ τ 6∈ H ′, m =
min({ = Su s.t. ∀u ∈ τ ∧ u ∈ S})}
8: S = {(u, )|∀τ ∈ T , ∀u ∈ τ, u 6∈ R, k(u) ≥
(Hτ − λ)}
9: R = R∪ S
10: return R
Proposition 1. Given a set of cascades T , a thresh-
old θ, parameter λ, and causality values k where k ∈
{K&M, rel, nb, wnb}, ProSel returns a set of users R =
{u|k(u) ≥ θ or ∃u′ s.t. u′, u ∈ τ, k(u) ≥ k(u′) −
λ and u′ is picked}. Set R is equivalent to the set S in
Problem 2.
Proposition 2. The time complexity of Algorithm ProSel is
O(|T | × avg(log(|τ |))× |U |).
IV. ISIS DATASET
Our dataset consists of ISIS related tweets/retweets in Ara-
bic gathered from Feb. 2016 to May 2016. The dataset includes
(a) All users (b) Distinct users
Fig. 2: Distribution of cascades vs cascade size
tweets and the associated information such as user ID, re-tweet
ID, hashtags, content, date and time. About 53M tweets are
collected based on the 290 hashtags such as Terrorism, State of
the Islamic-Caliphate, Rebels, Burqa State, and Bashar-Assad,
Ahrar Al-Sham, and Syrian Army. In this paper, we only use
tweets (more than 9M) associated with viral cascades. The
statistics of the dataset are presented in Table III discussed in
details below.
TABLE III: Statistics of the dataset
Name Values
Tweets 9,092,978
Cascades 35,251
Users 1,249,293
Generator users 8,056
Cascades. In this paper, we aim to identify PSM accounts
- which in this dataset are mainly social bots or terrorism-
supporting accounts that participate in viral cascades. The
tweets that have been retweeted from 102 to 18,892 times.
This leads to more than 35k cascades which are tweeted or
retweeted by more than 1M users. The distribution of the
number of cascades vs cascade size is illustrated in Fig. 2a.
There are users that retweet their own tweet or retweet a
post several times, we only consider the first tweet/retweet
of each user for a given cascade. In other words, duplicate
users are removed from the cascades, which make the size
of the viral cascades from 20 to 18,789 as shown in Fig. 2b.
The distribution of the cascades over the cascade life span is
illustrated in Fig. 3a. Cascades took from 16 seconds to more
than 94 days to complete.
Users. There are more than 1M users that have participated
in the viral cascades. Fig. 3b demonstrates the cumulative
distribution of the number of times a user have participated in
the cascades. As it is shown, the larger the support value is,
the less number of users exists. Moreover, users have tweeted
or retweeted posts from 1 to 3,904 times and on average each
user has participated more than 7 times.
User’s Current Status. We select key users that have tweeted
or retweeted a post in its early life span - among first half of the
users (according to Definition 2, φ = 0.5), and check whether
they are active or not. Accounts are not active if they are
(a)
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(b) (c)
Fig. 3: a) Cumulative distribution of duration of cascades. b) Cumulative distribution of user’s occurrence in the dataset. c)
Total inactive users in every cascade
TABLE IV: Status of a subset of the users in the dataset.
Name Active Inactive Total
Users 723,727 93,770 817,497
Generator users 7,243 813 8,056
suspended or deleted. More than 88% of the users are active
as shown in Table IV. The statistics of the generator users are
also reported. Generator users are those that have initiated a
viral cascade. As shown, 90% of the generator users are active
as well. Moreover, there are a significant number of cascades
with hundreds of inactive users. The number of inactive users
in every cascade is illustrated in Fig. 3c. Inactive users are
representative of automatic and terrorism accounts aiming to
disseminate their propaganda and manipulate the statistics of
the hashtags of their interest.
Generator Users. In this part, we only consider users that
have generated (started) the viral tweets. According to Ta-
ble IV, there are more than 7k active and 800 inactive
generator users. That is, more than 10% of the generator users
are suspended or deleted, which means they are potentially
automated accounts. The distribution of the number of tweets
generated by generator users shows that most of the users (no
matter active and inactive) have generated a few posts (less
than or equal to 3) while only a limited number of users are
with a large number of tweets.
V. CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
Here we examine the behavior of the causality metrics.
We analyze users considering their current account status in
Twitter. We label a user as active (inactive) if the account is
still active (suspended or deleted).
Kleinberg-Mishra Causality. We study the users that get
their causality value of K&M greater than or equal to 0.5.
As expected, inactive users exhibit different distribution from
active users (Fig. 4a). We note that significant differences are
present - more than 75% of the active users are distributed
between 0.5 and 0.62, while more than 50% of the inactive
users are distributed from 0.75 to 1. Also, inactive users have
larger values of mean and median than active ones. Note
that number of active and inactive users are 404,536 and
52,452. This confirms that this metric is a good indicator to
discriminate PSM users from the normal users.
(a) K&M ≥ 0.5 (b) rel ≥ 2
(c) nb ≥ 0.5 (d) wnb ≥ 0.5
Fig. 4: Distribution of various causality metrics for active and
inactive users.
Relative Likelihood Causality. This metric magnifies the
interval between every pairs of the probabilities that measures
the causality of the users; therefore, the values vary in a wide
range. Fig. 4b displays the distribution of users having relative
likelihood causality of greater than or equal to two. In this
metric, 1,274 users get very large values. For the sake of
readability, very large values are replaced with 34.0 in Fig. 4b.
More than 50% of the inactive users get values greater than
32, while the median of active users is 2.48. More than 75%
of the active users are distributed in the range of (2, 4). Note
that number of active and inactive users in this figure are 3,563
and 1,041, respectively. That is, using this metric and filtering
users with the relative likelihood greater than a threshold, leads
to the good precision. For example, the threshold in Fig. 4b
is set to 2 - the precision is more than 0.22 for inactive class.
Considering users with a very large value leads to the precision
of more than 0.5 and uncovering a significant number of PSMs
- 638 inactive users.
Neighborhood-Based Causality. We study the users that get
their causality value of nb greater than or equal to 0.5.
As expected, inactive users exhibit different distribution from
active users as shown in Fig. 4c. Also, inactive users are mostly
distributed in the higher range and have larger values of mean
and median than active ones. More than 75% of the active
users are distributed between 0.5 and 0.6, while more than 50%
of the inactive users are distributed from 0.6 to 1. Therefore,
increasing the threshold results in the higher precision for the
PSM users. Note that the number of active and inactive users
are 85,864 and 10,165.
Weighted Neighborhood-Based Causality. This metric is
the weighted version of the previous metric (nb). We assign
weight to each user in proportion to her participation rate in
the viral cascades. Fig. 4d shows the distribution of users with
wnb greater than or equal to 0.5. This metric also displays
different distribution for active and inactive users. More than
75% of the active users are distributed between 0.5 and 0.6,
while more than 50% of the inactive users are distributed from
0.6 to 1. Note that the number of active and inactive users
of wnb are 52,346 and 16,412. In other words, this metric
achieves the largest precision compared to other metrics, 0.24.
Clearly, increasing the threshold results in the higher precision
for the PSMs.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We implement our code in Scala Spark and Python 2.7x and
run it on a machine equipped with an Intel Xeon CPU (1.6
GHz) with 128 GB of RAM running Windows 7. We set the
parameter φ to label key users 0.5 (Definition 2). Thus, we
are looking for the users that participate in the action before
the number of participants gets twice.
In the following sections, first we look at the existing
methods. Then we look at two proposed approaches (see Sec-
tion III): (1) Threshold-Based Selection Approach - selecting
users based on a specific threshold, (2) Label Propagation
Selection Approach - selecting by applying Algorithm 1. The
intuition behind this approach is to select a user if it has a
score higher than a threshold or has a lower score but occurs in
the cascades that high score users exist. We evaluate methods
based on true positive (True Pos), false positive (False Pos),
precision, the average (Avg CS) and median (Med CS) of
cascade size of the detected PSM accounts. Note that in our
problem, precision is the most important metric. The main
reason is labeling an account as PSM means it should be
deleted. However, removing a real user is costly. Therefore, it
is important to have a high precison to prevent removing real
user.
A. Existing Method
Here we use the approach proposed by the top-ranked
team in the DARPA Twitter Bot Challenge [10]. We consider
all features that we could extract from our dataset. Our
features include tweet syntax (average number of hashtags,
average number of user mentions, average number of links,
average number of special characters), tweet semantics (LDA
topics), and user behaviour (tweet spread, tweet frequency,
tweet repeats). We apply three existing methods to detect
PSM accounts: 1) Random selection: This method achieves
the precision of 0.11. This also presents that our data is
imbalanced and less than 12% of the users are PSM accounts.
2) Sentimetrix (Sentimet.): We cluster our data by DBSCAN
algorithm. We then propagate the labels from 40 initial users
to the users in each cluster based on the similarity metric.
We use Support Vector Machines (SVM) to classify the re-
maining PSM accounts [10]. 3) Classification methods: In this
experiment, we use the same labeled accounts as the previous
experiment and apply different machine learning algorithms
to predict the label of other samples. We group features based
on the limitations of access to data into three categories.
First, we consider only using content information (Content) to
detect the PSM accounts. Second, we use content independent
features (NoCont.) [10] to classify users. Third, we apply all
features (All feat.) to discriminate PSM accounts. The best
result for each setting is when we apply Random Forest using
all features. According to the results, this method achieves
the highest precision of 0.16. Note that, most of the features
used in the previous work and our baseline take advantage
of both content and network structure. However, there are
situations that the network information and content do not
exist. In this situation, the best baseline has the precision of
0.15. We study the average (Avg CS) and median (Med CS) of
the size of the cascades in which the selected PSM accounts
have participated. Table V also illustrates the false positive,
true positive and precision of different methods.
TABLE V: Existing Methods - number of selected users as PSM
Method False Pos True Pos Precision Avg CS Med CS
Random 80,700 10,346 0.11 289.99 184
Sentimet. 640,552 77,984 0.11 261.37 171
Content 292,039 43,483 0.13 267.66 174
NoCont. 357,027 63,025 0.15 262.97 172
Allfeat. 164,012 31,131 0.16 273.21 176
B. Threshold-Based Selection Approach
In this experiment, we select all the users that satisfy the
thresholds and check whether they are active or not. A user
is inactive, if the account is suspended or closed. Since the
dataset is not labeled, we label inactive users as PSM accounts.
We set the threshold for all metrics to 0.7 except for relative
likelihood causality (rel), which is set to 7. We conduct two
types of experiments: first, we study user selection for a given
causality metric. We further study this approach using the
combinations of metrics.
Single Metric Selection. In this experiment, we attempt to
select users based on each individual metric. As expected,
these metrics can help us filter a significant amount of active
users and overcome the data imbalance issue. Metric K&M
achieves the largest recall in comparison with other metrics.
However, it has the largest number of false positives. Table VI
shows the performance of each metric. The precision value
varies from 0.43 to 0.66 and metric wnb achieves the best
value. Metric rel finds the more important PSM accounts
with average cascade size of 567.78 and median of 211. In
general, our detected PSM accounts have participated in the
larger cascades in comparison with baseline methods.
We also observe that these metrics cover different regions
of the search area. In other words, they select different user
sets with little overlap between each other. The common
users between any two pairs of the features are illustrated in
Table VII. Considering the union of all metrics, 36,983 and
30,353 active and inactive users are selected, respectively.
TABLE VI: Threshold-based selection approach - number of se-
lected users using single metric
Method False Pos True Pos Precision Avg CS Med CS
Allfeat. 164,012 31,131 0.16 273.21 176
NoCont. 357,027 63,025 0.15 262.97 172
K&M 36,159 27,192 0.43 383.99 178
rel 693 641 0.48 567.78 211
nb 2,268 2,927 0.56 369.46 183.5
wnb 7,463 14,409 0.66 311.84 164
TABLE VII: Threshold-based selection approach - number of
common selected users using single metric
Status Active Inactive
Method rel nb wnb rel nb wnb
K&M 404 1,903 6,992 338 2,340 11,748
rel 231 175 248 229
wnb 1,358 1,911
Combination of Metrics Selection. According to Table VII,
most of the metric pairs have more inactive users in common
than active users. In this experiment, we discuss if using the
combination of these metrics can help improve the perfor-
mance. We attempt to select users that satisfy the threshold
for at least three metrics. We get 1,636 inactive users out of
2,887 selected ones, which works better than K&M and rel
while worse than nb and wnb. In brief, this approach achieves
precision of 0.57. Moreover, the number of false positives
(1,251) is lower than most of the other metrics.
C. Label Propagation Selection Approach
In label propagation selection, we first select a set of
users that have a high causality score as seeds, then ProSel
selects users that occur with those seeds and have a score
higher than a threshold iteratively. Also, the seed set in each
iteration is the selected users of the previous iteration. The
intuition behind this approach is to select a user if it has
a score higher than a threshold or has a lower score but
occurs in the cascades that high score users occur. We set
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Fig. 5: Comparison between threshold-based and label propagation
selection approaches for the inactive class
the parameters of ProSel Algorithm as follows: λ = 0.1,
θ = 0.9, except for relative likelihood causality, where we
set λ = 1, θ = 9. Table VIII shows the performance of each
metric. Precision of these metrics varies from 0.47 to 0.75 and
wnb achieves the highest precision. Metrics rel with average
cascade size of 612.04 and nb with median of 230 find
the more important PSM accounts. Moreover, detected PSM
accounts have participated in the larger cascades compared
with threshold-based selection. This approach also produces
much lower number of false positives compared to threshold-
based selection. The comparison between this approach and
threshold-based selection is illustrated in Fig. 5. From the
precision perspective, label propagation method outperforms
the threshold-based one.
TABLE VIII: Label propagation selection approach - number of
selected users
Method False Pos True Pos Precision Avg CS Med CS
Allfeat. 164,012 31,131 0.16 273.21 176
NoCont. 357,027 63,025 0.15 262.97 172
K&M 9,305 14,176 0.60 390.52 179
rel 561 498 0.47 612.04 216
nb 1,101 1,768 0.62 403.55 230
wnb 1,318 4,000 0.75 355.24 183.5
The number of common users selected by any pair of two
metrics are also illustrated in Table IX. It shows that our
metrics are powerful to cover different regions of the search
area and identify different sets of users. In total, 10,254 distinct
active users and 16,096 inactive ones are selected.
TABLE IX: Label propagation selection approach - number of
common selected users
Status Active Inactive
Method rel nb wnb rel nb wnb
K&M 289 581 1,122 168 1,019 2,788
rel 15 6 180 102
nb 151 833
VII. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first
unsupervised approach on PSM detection. The majority of
previous work was based on three fundamental assumptions.
First, the information of the network is known [10], [15], [19],
[20]. This assumption may not hold in reality. Second, they are
language dependent [10], [8]. Third, the majority of botnet
detection algorithms focused on bots in general. That is, they
did consider the bots equally [8], [12] where in this work, we
identify PSM accounts that spread viral information. Here,
we review related work on identifying automatic accounts and
terrorist groups. Aside from the bot detection work, our work
can be compared with detection of water armies.
Identifying Automatic Accounts. Due to the importance
of the issue, DARPA conducted the Twitter bot detection
challenge to identify and eliminate influential bots [10]. In
this challenge, all teams applied supervised or semi-supervised
learning approaches using the diverse sets of features. Most
of the previous work extracted different sets of features (tweet
syntax and semantics, temporal behavior, user profile, and net-
work features) and conducted supervised or semi-supervised
approaches [10], [12], [8]. On the other hand, here, we focus
on situations where neither network information nor account
related attributes and user profile information are available.
Our appproach is also independent of content and language.
Analysis of Terrorist Groups and Detection of Water
Armies. Terrorist groups use social media for propaganda dis-
semination [21]. Benigni et al. [19] conducted vertex clustering
and classification to find Islamic Jihad Supporting Community
on Twitter. Abdokhodair et al. [20] studied the behaviors and
characteristics of Syrian social botnet. Chen et al. [3] found
that within the context of news report comments, user-specific
measurements can distinguish water army from normal users.
Similarly, in [4], Chen et al. applied user behavior and domain-
specific features to detect water armies. Our work is different
from them since these methods also applied features related to
the accounts and network (follower/followee). However, we do
not have any network information and account-related features.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted a data-driven study on the
pathogenic social media accounts especially terrorist support-
ers, automatic accounts and bots. We proposed unsupervised
causality based framework to detect these groups. Our ap-
proach identifies these users without using network structure,
cascade path information, content and user’s information. We
believe our technique can be applied in the areas such as
detection of water armies and fake news campaigns. Currently,
we are combining this method with complementary supervised
approaches [8] and are integrating it with LookingGlass [22]
in support of the U.S. Navy’s Minerva program. LookingGlass
will allow us to deploy this method for identifying PSM
accounts in support of real-world information operations.
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